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Preface
A Robust Control Approach to Option Pricing:
the Uniqueness Theorem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1–18
P. Bernhard, N. El Farouq
Abstract
We prove the missing uniqueness theorem which makes our probability-free the-
ory of option pricing in the interval market model, essentially complete.
Existence and Uniqueness of Nash Equilibria in a Simple
Lanchester Model of the Impact of Customer Churn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19–26
J. M. Binner, L. R. Fletcher, V. Kolokoltsov
Abstract
We model the impact of customer churn (turnover) on player payoffs in a duopolis-
tic market, distinguishing between loyal and non-loyal customers, using a Lanchester-
type model. We ensure that the underlying equations always have a feasible solution,
which cannot be taken for granted, and prove the existence and uniqueness of Nash
equilibria. We find algebraic conditions for a Nash equilibrium and then apply the
Brouwer Fixed Point Theorem to show that these conditions can be satisfied. Ex-
pressing these conditions as equations in which one side is an increasing function of
marketing effectiveness and the other side is decreasing proves that there can be no
more than one Nash equilibrium.
The Game-Theoretical Model of Selection Services in
Company with Various Ordering Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27–44
V. M. Bure, A. A. Sergeeva
Abstract
In this paper we consider the cases of different number of ordering schemes in
company which provide service for customers. The game-theoretic model of choosing
order service in each case is constructed. The model is a n-person game with perfect
information. We find equilibrium strategies for clients of different cases the number
of ordering schemes in the company. The existence of these equilibria is proved.
Numerical Approximation of Nash Equilibria for a Class of Non-Cooperative
Differential Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45–58
S. Cacace, E. Cristiani, M. Falcone
Abstract
In this paper we propose a numerical method to obtain an approximation of Nash
equilibria form-players non-cooperative games with a special structure. We consider
the infinite horizon problem in a case which leads to a system of m Hamilton-Jacobi
equations. The numerical method is based on the Dynamic Programming Principle
for every equation and on a global fixed point iteration. We present the numerical
solutions of some two-player games in one and two dimensions. The paper has an
experimental nature, but some features and properties of the approximation scheme
are discussed.
Public Goods in Networks: A Statistical Mechanics Approach . . . . . . . . . 59–80
L. Dall’Asta, P. Pin, A. Ramezanpour
Abstract
The problem of multiple Nash equilibria in games of strategic substitutes on
networks is studied. We consider a general model of public goods provision on
network, and analyze in detail the properties of Nash equilibria with particular
attention for the subset of equilibria that optimize some global quantities (optimal
equilibria) and to those that are robust to small perturbations (stable equilibria). We
conclude that finding good approximate optimal equilibria is not that difficult, and
we describe the performances of different algorithms. On the other hand, finding
stable equilibria is extremely difficult, by means of naive best-response dynamics as
well as using advanced message-passing algorithms. This is a consequence of the
intrinsically different spatial organization of the two sets of equilibria.
Network Congestion, Braess Paradox and
Urban Expressway System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81–100
B. Dong
Abstract
The “Braess Paradox” persists in transportation networks. This paper studies
the congestion properties in networks constituted by a set of circular and diffusive
expressways. We use a model with a single origin/multiple destination (E-net)
to depict the evening rush hour, and one destination/multiple origin (M-net) to
depict the morning rush hour. Conditions for efficient equilibrium in this model are
obtained. Policy recommendations in regard to capacity handicapping/enlargement
of key roads and differential parking charges are given.
Game-theoretical model of service quality choice: Portuguese mobile service
market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101–118
M. A. Gladkova, N. A. Zenkevich, A. A. Sorokina
Abstract
In this paper game-theoretical model of quality level choice under competition
is suggested in order to define optimal quality strategies of mobile operators. Sup-
pose that five firms provide homogeneous services differentiated by quality on the
industrial market. The game-theoretical model is presented as dynamic game. The
strong Nash equilibrium in the investigated game was obtained in the explicit form
which allowed us to evaluate prices, companies market shares and revenues in the
equilibrium. The survey was conducted in St. Petersburg and defined consumer
preferences and satisfaction with mobile service. The survey and game-theoretical
analysis of Portuguese industrial market allowed finding current and equilibrium
service quality levels. The results showed that all operators should increase service
quality. Following the equilibrium quality strategies, mobile operators may achieve
the increase of the average consumers monthly expenses. Market shares were also an-
alyzed and it was shown how the situation changes when applying game-theoretical
results for mobile operators of Portugal.
Paul Samuelson’s Critique and Equilibriums Concepts in
Evolutionary Game Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119–136
R. Joosteny
Abstract
We present two new evolutionary equilibria, the truly evolutionarily stable state
(TESS ) and the generalized evolutionarily stable equilibrium (GESE ). The latter
generalizes the evolutionarily stable equilibrium (ESE ) of Joosten [1996]. A GESE
attracts all nearby trajectories monotonically, i.e., the distance to equilibrium de-
creases steadily in time. The former generalizes the evolutionarily stable strategy
(ESS ) of Maynard Smith & Price [1973]. The TESS attracts nearby trajectories
too, but the dynamics’ behavior must be similar to that of the replicator dynamics
near an ESS.
Both notions immediately imply asymptotical stability for the dynamics at hand.
We consider this the relevant and conceptually right approach in defining evolu-
tionary equilibria, rather than defining a static equilibrium notion and search for
appropriate dynamics guaranteeing its dynamic stability.
Price Stackelberg Competition and Capacity Constrains . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137–144
L. Meng, C. Han, J. Wang
Abstract
Two identical firms compete with price as the strategic variable in a homogeneous
product duopoly game and in which the firms are limited by capacity constraints.
An efficient rationing rule is adopted. We show when the firms are symmetric, there
is a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE), where either both firms sell
at capacity and do equally well, or else there is a second mover advantage. We
analyze an asymmetric case and give the equilibrium.
An Inter-group Conflict Model Integrating Perceptions of Threat and Vested
Interest: Extending Rational Choice to
Incorporate Psychological Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145–164
G. Pierce, C. Boulay, M. Malyutov
Abstract
The prevalence of inter-group conflict throughout the world over the past cen-
tury has been widely examined from a broad range of substantive perspectives.
Among the factors that have received less attention in terms of their potential role
in inter-group conflicts are the psychological dynamics associated with changes in
the political attitudes of the populations of groups in conflict and also those of
their leaders as well as factors relating to the perceived success of conflict related
strategy. The present analysis attempts to integrate the potential psychological
effects of threat into a model of inter-group conflict that also incorporates actors
vested interest in conflict oriented policies and also the actors perception that such
policies will be successful. In the considered model, the immediate psychological
effects of an external threat may be very similar for both the general public and
political leaders. Moreover such reactions are expected to be in line with at least
some of the responses hypothesized from mortality salience theory. Other types of
reactions to an external threat may be quite different for the general public versus
their political leaders. The analysis attempts to incorporate into a game theoretic
framework, the likely impact of perceived and/or actual external threats on internal
inter-group political dynamics, and the potential consequence of these responses on
the informal and formal strategies selected to deal with perceived/actual threats.
Product Differentiation in the Presence of
Social Interactions of Consumers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165–176
F. P. A. Prado
Abstract
We present a dynamic game of location-price competition between two firms.
Differently from other Hotelling’s type models, we assume that consumers are pos-
itively influenced by the product choices of other consumers.
Our model suggests the existence of two types of oligopolies: one characterized by
agglomerations of players and another characterized by separations of them. This re-
sult generalizes the standard result of location-price competition as in d’Appremont
et al. (1979). It provides insights into product differentiation behaviors in cases
whereby consumers enjoy consuming products in the company of others (Becker,
1991) and decide in small groups where to consume from.
A Class of Differential Games with Random Terminal Time . . . . . . . . . . .177–192
E. V. Shevkoplyas , S. Yu. Kostyunin
Abstract
In the paper, a class of differential games is considered where the terminal time
of the game is treated as a random variable. For this game, the simplest form of
the expected integral payoff of the players is found and the sufficient conditions for
simplification of the integral payoff are formulated. The obtained simplified form is
used it to derive the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for the game with random
terminal time. Finally, a game-theoretical model of pollution control is considered.
For this particular example, both non-cooperative and cooperative forms of the
game are investigated.
The Present and Future of Game Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193–208
M. Shubik
Abstract
A broad nontechnical coverage of many of the developments in game theory since
the 1950s is given together with some comments on important open problems and
where some of the developments may take place. The nearly 90 references given
serve only as a minimal guide to the many thousands of books and articles that
have been written. The purpose here is to present a broad brush picture of the
many areas of study and application that have come into being. The use of deep
techniques flourishes best when it stays in touch with application. There is a vital
symbiotic relationship between good theory and practice. The breakneck speed of
development of game theory calls for an appreciation of both the many realities of
conflict, coordination and cooperation and the abstract investigation of all of them.
